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WHAT? 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Mass incarceration, lengthy probationary periods, unreachable bail 
amounts, and felony criminal records feed the machine of our criminal 
justice system. The system is not broken; the assembly line of arrest, charge, 
conviction, and imprisonment is doing exactly what it was built to do. But 
this inherited system is a plague upon the cornerstone of the “Progressive 
Prosecutor” who is charged with the role of the “Minister of Justice.”1 With 
nearly 10.6 million people rotating in and out of the U.S. jail system each 
                                                           
*Hao Quang Nguyen, JD 2010, Assistant Ramsey County Attorney. This paper is dedicated 
to Ronin & Asher Nguyen, my two beautiful boys. 
1 See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (holding that a government attorney is 
the representative “of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling 
as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is 
not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.”); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE § 3-1.2(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015) (“The primary duty of the prosecutor is to seek 
justice . . ., not merely to convict.”); Nat'l Dist. Attys. Ass'n, Nat’l Prosecution Standards, 
Standard 1.1 (2d ed. 1991) (“The primary responsibility of prosecution is to see that justice 
is accomplished.”). 
1
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year, the Progressive Prosecutor knows the old ways of doing things are no 
longer tenable.2  
As a minister of justice, the role of the prosecutor is not to obtain a 
conviction above all else, rather it is to see that justice be done.3 “The role 
of an American prosecutor as a minister of justice is firmly established.”4 It 
is easy to see how even the most skilled prosecutor can still, even with the 
best of intentions, fail as a minister of justice. Prosecution work is one of the 
most emotionally challenging lines of public service one can choose. 
Secondary trauma from crime scene visits, autopsy reviews, and victim 
interviews added to the stress of battling opposing counsel in front of a jury 
who will ultimately decide guilt or innocence takes a toll on even the most 
resilient prosecutor.  
What, then, is the path of least resistance when a prosecutor is already 
stressed and pushed to the limit? It is to achieve a conviction. After all, it is 
a measurable unit of success; guilty verdicts equal success—a simple and easy 
equation to understand.5 The prosecutor, at their core, is to be a minister of 
justice above all else. Their choices should consider what is best for the 
defendant as much as they consider what it does for the victim.  
                                                           
2 See Brennan Ctr. for Justice & The Justice Collaborative, 21 Principles for the 21st Century 
Prosecutor, FAIR AND JUST PROSECUTION 3 (2018), https://fairandjustprosecution.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/12/FJP_21Principles_Interactive-w-destinations.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/L7KC-FFV6]. 
3 See 9 MINN. PRAC., CRIM. LAW & PROC. § 34:3 n.7 (4th ed.) (2018) (quoting State v. Clark, 
114 Minn. 342, 344, 131 N.W. 369, 370 (Minn. 1911)) (“The duties and obligations of a 
prosecuting officer are not simply those of an attorney in a civil action; for behind him, and 
largely at his command, are all the forces of organized society. He has by virtue of his office, 
if worthy of it, great influence with juries, and he should never forget that he is the 
representative of the sovereignty and justice of the state, and that he must bear himself, in 
the discharge of his official duties, as a minister of justice, and never as a partisan.”). 
4 State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 300 (Minn. 2006) (citing Berger v. United States, 295 
U.S. 78, 88 (1935)). See In re Jacobs, 802 N.W.2d 748, 752 (Minn. 2011) (quoting State v. 
Penkaty, 708 N.W.2d 185, 196–97 (Minn. 2006)) (“The prosecutor's duty ‘to see that justice 
is done on behalf of both the victim and the defendant’ overrides any individual or 
governmental interest in winning cases.”); State v. Cabrera, 700 N.W.2d 469, 475 (Minn. 
2005) (quoting State v. Salitros, 499 N.W.2d 815, 817 (Minn. 1993)) (“[The] prosecutor ‘is 
a minister of justice’ whose obligation is ‘to guard the rights of the accused as well as to 
enforce the rights of the public.’”); State v. Henderson, 620 N.W.2d 688, 701–02 (Minn. 
2001) (citing State v. Sha, 193 N.W.2d 829, 831 (Minn. 1972)) (“Prosecutors have an 
affirmative obligation to ensure that a defendant receives a fair trial.”); State v. 
Timmendequas, 737 A.2d 55, 93 (N.J. 1999) (citing State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188, 288 
(N. J. 1987)) (“[T]he primary duty of a prosecutor is not to obtain convictions but to see that 
justice is done.”). See also STANDARDS ON PROSECUTORIAL INVESTIGATIONS § 1.2(a) (AM. 
BAR ASS’N 2008), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/publications/criminal_justice_section
_archive/crimjust_standards_pinvestigate/ [https://perma.cc/X2AJ-NDZF]. 
5 See Eric Rasmusen et al., Convictions Versus Conviction Rates: The Prosecutor’s Choice, 
11 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 47, 48 (2009) (discussing the use of conviction rates as a measures 
of a prosecutor’s success). 
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The math is not simple anymore in the context of the justice system. 
Guilty verdicts no longer equal success—justice now equals success. Like it 
or not, prosecutors have been partly waning at their true duties for a while 
now. As an individual who has served as a prosecutor for ten years and, 
prior to that, as a law enforcement officer for nearly five years, it is clear to 
me that most prosecutors, at their core, are good people who want to do 
right by the public they serve. However, the system they inherited is not built 
to allow them much, if any, meaningful success in that goal. Court dockets 
are overcrowded with cases. Time and money are always low. Finding 
meaningful solutions often requires prosecutors to step off the assembly line 
of justice, many times demanding they do something entirely outside their 
training. The failure of the prosecution in the fulfillment of their role as 
minister of justice in the criminal justice system is not, in my humble 
opinion, intentional. Its ideals have just been long forgotten and set to the 
wayside—a frill that comes out once in a while when there is time to slow 
down and actually evaluate a case realistically. For this reason, it has simply 
become easier for prosecutors to go after the conviction and a sentence, 
both of which are very tangible measures of so-called success.  
A. The Progressive Prosecutor: Fighting the Public’s Historical Perception 
Enter the rise of the Progressive Prosecutor. A Progressive Prosecutor 
is different from that of the ordinary prosecutor because he or she seeks to 
use their discretion not to punish or simply deal out heavy sanctions on the 
accused but rather divert criminal proceedings, expunge criminal records, 
limit jail sanctions, and even dismiss unnecessary prosecutions all together.6  
These Progressive Prosecutors, when the facts call for it, actively 
prosecute police officers for criminal violations. Minnesota recently had two 
high profile cases involving the charging of police officers for murder. In 
Hennepin County, County Attorney Mike Freeman announced murder 
charges against Minneapolis police officer Mohamed Noor after he and a 
partner responded to a 911 call for help.7 At that call, Officer Noor shot and 
                                                           
6 Across the country, voters are electing these nontraditional, more Progressive Prosecutors. 
See The Paradox of “Progressive Prosecution”, 132 HARV. L. REV. 748, 751–52 (2018) 
(“Fundamentally, progressive prosecutors seek to rebalance the use of prosecutorial 
discretion. Where traditional prosecutors have used their enforcement powers in a heavy-
handed manner to punish marginalized individuals, Progressive Prosecutors institute 
practices that pull back on those punitive measures, or, at least, divert them. And where 
traditional prosecutors have refused to exercise their expansive powers to hold police 
accountable for misdeeds, progressive prosecutors (sometimes) actively prosecute police 
officers.”).  
7 Brandt Williams, Mukhtar M. Ibrahim, Jon Collins, & Riham Feshir, Freeman: Mpls. Cop 
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killed an unarmed woman.8 Officer Noor was convicted and sentenced to 
150 months in prison.9 This case was one of the first times “a Minneapolis 
officer has been charged with murder in a fatal shooting while on duty.”10  
Similarly, in Ramsey County, County Attorney John Choi announced 
criminal charges against Officer Jeronimo Yanez of the Falcon Heights 
Police Department for the killing of a black male passenger seated in the 
front of an automobile during an investigatory traffic stop.11 Choi stated that 
his “decision [would] be difficult for some in our community to accept, but 
in order to achieve justice, we must be willing to do the right thing no matter 
how hard it may seem.”12  Officer Yanez was found not guilty by a jury 
verdict.13 
The prosecution of police officers for wrongdoing from small offenses 
to manslaughter and murder set today’s Progressive Prosecutors apart from 
their historical counterparts. Traditionally, the public and the police viewed 
law enforcement and the prosecutor’s office as one and the same. This has 
never legally been the case, but it was certainly true in the court of public 
opinion and perception.14 
The power of discretion wielded by a prosecutor is wide and over-
reaching; how a prosecutor exercises that discretion can, and does, make a 
                                                           
8 Id. 
9 Ralph Ellis & Melissa Alonso, Mohamed Noor, former Minneapolis police officer, 




11 Tim Nelson, John Collins, & Riham Feshir, Officer Charged in Castile Shooting, 
MPRNEWS (Nov. 16, 2016, 10:30 AM), https://www.mprnews.org/story/2016/11/16/officer-
charged-in-castile-shooting [https://perma.cc/9GBC-K73J]. 
12 Id. (“[County Attorney John Choi] charged police officer Jeronimo Yanez in the July 6 
killing of Philando Castile during a traffic stop in Falcon Heights. . . . During the 
announcement of the charges, Choi went over the timeline leading up to Castile's death. He 
said Yanez signaled to another officer that he was pulling Castile’s car over because his ‘wide-
set nose’ matched the description of a robbery suspect. Yanez turned on his squad lights, and 
Castile pulled over eight seconds later. It was just one minute later that Yanez shot Castile 
seven times, killing him.”). 
13 Mitch Smith, Minnesota Officer Acquitted in Killing of Philando Castile, N.Y. TIMES (June 
16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/16/us/police-shooting-trial-philando-
castile.html [https://perma.cc/A6H4-7FYC]. 
14 Letitia James, Prosecutors and Police: The Inherent Conflict in Our Courts, MSNBC (Dec. 
5, 2014, 12:16 AM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/prosecutors-police-inherent-conflict-
our-courts [https://perma.cc/4QEG-D4SA] (discussing the potential dangers of the 
relationship between law enforcement and prosecutors); See Rahel Gebreyes, The Close 
Relationship between Prosecutors and Police Officers, HUFF POST (Jan. 12, 2016, 1:25 PM), 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/police-prosecutor-
relationship_n_56951b56e4b09dbb4bac9218?guccounter=1 [https://perma.cc/42TA—
8EYF] (noting the questionable ties that may exist between the police and prosecutors). 
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monumental difference in the lives of the accused, victims, and families 
involved.15 
Several principles and practices have emerged as useful tools for the 
21st century Progressive Prosecutor aimed at two major goals: reduction of 
incarceration rates and increased fairness in the administration of justice.16 
This paper discusses the ways Progressive Prosecutors use their broad 
discretionary authority as ministers of justice and argues that such methods 
should be used to renounce the conviction-driven system and promote 
more equitable and fair justice for all. Part II of this Article addresses the 
Progressive Prosecutor-based tools that other prosecutors should use to 
further the goal of reducing mass incarceration.17 Part III of this Article 
discusses tools prosecutors can rely on to increase the overall equity and 
fairness within the criminal justice system.18 Finally, Part IV of this Article 
furthers the proposition that such tools revert the core value of the 
prosecutor back to the role of the justice ministry.19 
II. PROSECUTORIAL TOOLS FOR REDUCING MASS INCARCERATION 
If it is not working, then stop doing it. Mass incarceration20 is not the 
answer. Although society appears to care little about the incarcerated, mass 
incarceration does not need to be allowed, let alone perpetuated. One does 
not need mathematical prowess to see the solution. If mass incarceration is 
the problem, prosecutors should stop sending people to prison. Or, at the 
very least, prosecutors should send fewer people to prison.  
A. Diversion Before All Else, Well Before Much Else 
To combat the mass incarceration problem, Progressive Prosecutors 
are making diversion the rule.21 Diversion programs utilize prosecutorial 
discretion and move the flow of people away from the criminal justice 
system. These programs keep people free from unnecessary prosecution 
and lengthy probationary terms, all the while preserving valuable resources22 
                                                           
15 Sam Reisman, The Rise of the Progressive Prosecutor, LAW 360 (Apr. 7, 2019), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1145615/the-rise-of-the-progressive-prosecutor 
[https://perma.cc/KVJ9-WYM4] (describing a “no cash bail” policy to allow people to return 
to their families and lives). 
16 Brennan Ctr. for Justice & The Justice Collaborative, supra note 2, at 4.  
17 Infra at 9. 
18 Infra at 27. 
19 Infra at 34.  
20 See generally James Forman, Jr., Why Care About Mass Incarceration?, 108 MICH. L. 
REV. 993 (2010). 
21 Brennan Ctr. for Justice & The Justice Collaborative, supra note 2. 
22 Ashmini G. Kerodal, Prosecutor Led Diversion A National Study, CTR. FOR CT. 
INNOVATION (March 2019), https://www.courtinnovation.org/publications/prosecutor-led-
diversion-national-survey [https://perma.cc/Z8W3-7K7P]. 
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that would otherwise go into paying for the management of jails, prisons, 
probation officers, and costs of prosecution.23 
[Diversion] alternatives reroute defendants away from traditional 
criminal justice processing after arrest but prior to adjudication or 
final entry of judgment. Pretrial diversion is designed to address 
factors, called criminogenic needs that contribute to criminal 
behavior of the accused. Laws generally require that participation 
in diversion is voluntary and that the accused has access to 
counsel prior to making the decision to participate. Individuals 
are diverted prior to entry of judgment or conviction and a guilty 
plea may or may not be required. Successful completion of the 
program results in a dismissal of charges.24 
 
Diversion is not just a lofty goal; it is also established by statutory law.25 
Minnesota Statutes section 401.065 provides guidelines, definitions, and 
authority for the adoption and establishment of statewide diversion 
programs in Minnesota.26 The statute governs pretrial diversion programs, 
outlines what county attorneys must do when establishing a pretrial 
diversion program, and provides guidance on what components are 
necessary for the program to be functional.27 Finally, the statute sets forth 
data reporting requirements to the state legislature.28 As of 2017, across the 
nation, forty-eight states and the District of Columbia have enacted pretrial 
diversion programs similar to Minnesota’s statutory pretrial scheme.29 
                                                           
23 Study: Replacing Prison Terms with Drug Abuse Treatment Could Save Billions in 
Criminal Justice Costs, RTI INT’L (Jan. 8, 2013), https://www.rti.org/news/study-replacing-
prison-drug-treatment-could-save [https://perma.cc/V222-WFDW] (“Sending drug abusers 
to community-based treatment programs rather than prison could help reduce crime and 
save the criminal justice system billions of dollars . . . Nearly half of all state prisoners are 
drug abusers or drug dependent, but only 10 percent receive medically based drug treatment 
during incarceration.”). 
24 Pretrial Diversion, NAT’L. CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Sept. 28, 2017), 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/pretrial-diversion.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/7A7L-Z97A]. 
25 MINN. STAT. § 401.065, subdiv. 2 (2019) (Minnesota’s Pretrial Diversion Statute requires 
every county attorney to “establish a pretrial diversion program for adult offenders”). 
26 Id.  
27 MINN. STAT. § 401.065, subdiv. 3 (2019) (These Pretrial Diversion Programs may include 
candidate screenings, chemical dependency assessments, and establish goals for offenders). 
28 MINN. STAT. § 401.065, subdiv. 4 (2019) (Each program shall report to the Bureau of 
Criminal Apprehension vital information regarding each offender participating in the 
program). 
29 NAT’L. CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, supra note 24 (“Statutory diversion programs and 
treatment courts are often created by law to address the needs of a specific defendant 
population. Forty-three states and the District of Columbia have population-specific 
diversion programs which include: Thirty-nine states have diversion alternatives that address 
substance abuse. These programs or treatment courts are available to people charged with 
drug or alcohol-related offenses as well as defendants identified as having substance abuse or 
addiction needs. (The information below excludes DUI specific diversion programs and 
6
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 The question is whether pretrial diversion programs actually work. 
There is no simple answer. The National Association of Pretrial Service 
Agencies put together a comprehensive framework that individual agencies 
can use to measure the successes, failures, and weaknesses of their 
individual programs.30 What we can be sure about regarding pretrial justice 
and diversion programs is that diversion results in little-to-no criminal 
records for those given a chance through these programs. We know 
dismissal of a crime results in zero collateral damage to an accused’s future 
in employment, work, and social stigma.31 However, the landscape of 
pretrial diversion and analysis of the programs’ effectiveness would leave 
any researcher’s mind boggled. The fact is there is no simple answer about 
whether diversion programs produce a benefit that outweighs the downfalls. 
Many prosecutors believe there cannot be a downside when giving people a 
second chance as well as opportunities to better themselves. Prosecutors 
should not rely on statistics alone to tell us that it is a good thing to help 
those who have made bad choices get out from underneath the foot of the 
government. We should instead rely upon the successes that such programs 
have the capability of producing. 
B. Discretion in Charging Policy: Fairness First 
Another major tool that must be utilized by the Progressive Prosecutor 
is charging fairly and appropriately. Progressive Prosecutors know they have 
broad discretion in their decision to bring forth charges. Prosecutors, like 
police officers, have charging authority, but the only difference between the 
two parties is that prosecutors have the final word in the charges brought 
against the accused.32 For example, if a prosecutor so desired, they have the 
authority to dismiss a police officer’s charges against the accused entirely.33 
                                                           
courts). Twenty-four states have diversion alternatives for individuals identified as having 
needs related to mental illness.”). 
30 Measuring for Results: Outcome and Performance Measures for Pretrial Diversion Fields, 
NAT’L. ASS’N. OF PRETRIAL SERVICES AGENCIES, 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/static.nicic.gov/Library/029722.pdf [https://perma.cc/LN4M-
58BP].  
31 See Simone Ispa-Landa & Charles E. Loeffler, Indefinite Punishment and the Criminal 
Record: Stigma Reports Among Expungement-Seekers in Illinois, AM. SOC’Y OF 
CRIMINOLOGY (2016), 
https://www.sesp.northwestern.edu/docs/publications/279299815a1452bc75a5b.pdf 
(Analyzing how individuals with criminal record histories “understand their experiences, 
strategize to overcome criminal record stigma, and respond to criminal record 
discrimination.”); see also Regina Austin, “The Shame of it All”: Stigma and the Political 
Disenfranchisement of Formerly Convicted and Incarcerated Persons, 36 Colum. Hum. Rts. 
L. Rev. 174, 174–75 (2004), 
https://www.law.upenn.edu/cf/faculty/raustin/workingpapers/b36ColumbiaHumRtsLR173(
2004).pdf. 
32 MINN. R. CRIM. P. 2.02 (2019). 
33 MINN. R. CRIM. P. 30.01 (2019). 
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Prosecutors can also add or amend a police officer’s charges.34 Similar to 
the authority to dismiss recommended charges, prosecutors also have the 
authority to bring forth additional charges against an accused without relying 
on a police officer to do so.35 In other words, prosecutors have significantly 
broad discretion when making charging decisions or declining prosecution.36  
With this discretionary charging power, Progressive Prosecutors 
review and analyze which cases fall into the category of “needless 
prosecution.”37 These defendants are thereby given second chances at a 
criminal-record-free life. Discretion and helping those who have been 
accused requires a major leap of faith from the prosecutor. Take, for 
example, a defendant that is very physically ill and mentally incapacitated. 
At his group home, the defendant pulls a knife out of a kitchen drawer and 
threatens the life of a staff member. At first blush, one could easily charge 
the defendant with second-degree assault and terroristic threats, and such 
charges would sound rather reasonable. In this scenario, it is easy to fall into 
the mindset that a prosecutor must get the conviction and send this 
defendant to prison. But when a Progressive Prosecutor reviews such a case, 
they must consider alternatives that truly attain justice.38 
In making such charging decisions, a Progressive Prosecutor must 
speak to the victim. One might learn that the victim is not mad at nor scared 
of the defendant. The victim may explain that the defendant had a mental 
health crisis and knew the defendant did not intend to cause harm. A 
Progressive Prosecutor would find that, in understanding mental illness, the 
victim wants the best for the defendant. A Progressive Prosecutor might then 
                                                           
34 MINN. R. CRIM. P. 17.05 (2019). 
35 MINN. R. CRIM. P. 30.01 (2019). 
36 State v. Strok, 786 N.W.2d 297, 302 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010). 
37 See generally, Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22 (1977) (“The overriding purpose of 
that policy is to protect the individual from any unfairness associated with needless multiple 
prosecutions, and accordingly the defendant should receive the benefit of the policy 
whenever its application is urged by the Government.”) (emphasis added); see also Statement 
from Governor Andrew M. Cuomo on MTA Fare Evasion, NEW YORK STATE, 
https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/statement-governor-andrew-m-cuomo-mta-fare-evasion 
[https://perma.cc/G4FF-EBWX] (“We need to enact sensible reforms that strike the right 
balance by ensuring the safety of the subways, enforcing the law, and protecting New Yorkers 
from needless prosecution.”) (emphasis added); Julio Negron, THE NATIONAL REGISTRY OF 
EXONERATIONS, 
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=5248 
[https://perma.cc/QTU4-7ZCN] (“[T]he grand jury proceedings would have been different 
and that the grand jury would have determined that this was a needless or unfounded 
prosecution . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
38 David Chanen, Hennepin County Prosecutor Won’t Charge People Caught with Small 
Amounts of Marijuana, STAR TRIBUNE (Mar. 15, 2019), 
http://www.startribune.com/hennepin-county-attorney-won-t-prosecute-people-caught-with-
small-amounts-of-marijuana/507174002/ [https://perma.cc/5RW6-QLU3]; Sarah Horner, 
New Ramsey County Program Would Give More Offenders a Second Chance, Pioneer 
Press (Aug. 8, 2019), https://www.twincities.com/2019/08/19/new-ramsey-county-program-
would-give-more-offenders-a-second-chance/ [https://perma.cc/6FMV-6EM3].  
8
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 2
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol46/iss2/2
2020] PROGRESSIVE PROSECUTION 333 
  
dig more into a defendant’s mental illness by speaking with probation 
officers. The defendant was previously convicted of drug possession and 
was on probation. Aside from that conviction, the defendant had a clean 
criminal record since 2010, which coincidentally was about the time the 
defendant was formally diagnosed with schizophrenia. 
The Progressive Prosecutor learns all of this important, and often 
overlooked, information before court. At his first appearance, the defendant 
can barely walk, and he needs help from his caregiver to get to the floor of 
the courtroom. His defense attorney keeps him steady as they stand before 
the judge. It is clear that this defendant, in his current accommodation, has 
access to services like housing, mental health treatment, recreational 
therapy, and cognitive therapy. From this set of facts, a Progressive 
Prosecutor must understand how to appropriately use his discretion. The 
wrong decision would be to convict the defendant and send him to prison. 
When he finally gets out in several years, all his services would be gone, his 
progress gone, and he would likely end up hurting himself or someone else. 
The perpetuation of this cycle is needless.  
 From a Progressive Prosecutor’s prospective, the theoretical right 
thing to do in this case is to dismiss the charges. Although this is a “winnable” 
case and has all the legal elements necessary to sustain a conviction, the 
correct exercise of discretion is to simply do nothing. I have learned that 
sometimes by doing nothing, you are doing a lot for those involved. In in 
the end, the victim, the defendant, and the probation officer felt as though 
justice had been done. For me, that was a successful prosecution.  
C. Plea Bargain Discretion 
Just as with charging, prosecutors have broad discretion in the plea 
bargain process.39 This process has been widely utilized since the 1920s,40 
one in which even the court itself may not participate in.41 One common 
prosecutorial strategy used is to urge a defendant to plead to their charges 
and avoid trial. If a criminal defendant fails to settle a case, the prosecutor 
can bring more severe charges against a defendant. These added charges 
                                                           
39 Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 144 (2012) (likening the plea bargain process to horse 
trading between prosecutors and defense counsel). 
40 By the late 1920s, “plea bargaining had become a central feature of the administration of 
justice.” Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 29 
(1979).  A number of factors may have influenced the development and increased use of 
plea bargaining, including urbanization, increased crime rates, increased criminal caseloads, 
expansion of substantive criminal law, and the growing complexity of the trial process. See 
id. at 42; see also John H. Langbein, Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 
13 L. & SOC'Y REV. 261, 262 (1979); Brief for Appellant at 5, Puckett v. United States, 556 
U.S. 129 (2009) (No. 07-9712), 2008 WL 4992692. 
41 MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15.04, subdiv. 3 (2019) (“A district court judge must not participate in 
plea negotiations.”).  
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often come with harsher punishments such as increased incarceration time 
and probationary terms. With plea bargain discretion, prosecutors have 
traditionally used this system to procure convictions while preserving the 
cost and resources that a criminal jury trial would otherwise consume.42 
Courts recognize the plea bargain process is a critical stage in which an 
accused should be afforded due process.43 The threat of additional and 
more severe charges applies pressure to the accused and, at times, procures 
a plea of guilty.  
However, the plea bargain process is not without its critics. Plea 
bargaining has the effect of extorting guilty pleas from the innocent while 
also damaging the integrity of the American jury trial system.44 Trial by a jury 
of one’s peers, the presumption of innocence, and proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt: these rights are the bedrock of our criminal justice and 
jury trial system, and yet we know that the majority of cases that come 
through the scheme are dealt with via plea bargain.45 The process then 
becomes dominated by plea deals as opposed to one that tests evidence 
against the standard of “proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”46 Given the 
                                                           
42 In many—perhaps most—countries of the world, American-style plea bargaining is 
forbidden in cases as serious as this one, even for the limited purpose of obtaining testimony 
that enables conviction of a greater malefactor, much less for the purpose of sparing the 
expense of trial. See, e.g., STEPHEN THAMAN, WORLD PLEA BARGAINING 363–66 (S. 
Thaman ed. 2010). In Europe, many countries adhere to what they aptly call the “legality 
principle” by requiring prosecutors to charge all prosecutable offenses, which is typically 
incompatible with the practice of charge-bargaining. See, e.g., id. at xxii; John H. Langbein, 
Land Without Plea Bargaining: How the Germans Do It, 78 MICH. L. REV. 204, 210–11 
(1979) (describing the “Legalitätsprinzip,” or rule of compulsory prosecution, in Germany). 
Such a system reflects an admirable belief that the law is the law, and those who break it 
should pay the penalty provided. In the United States, we have plea bargaining aplenty, but 
until today it has been regarded as a necessary evil. It presents grave risks of prosecutorial 
overcharging that effectively compels an innocent defendant to avoid massive risk by pleading 
guilty to a lesser offense; and for guilty defendants it often—perhaps usually—results in a 
sentence well below what the law prescribes for the actual crime. But even so, we accept plea 
bargaining because many believe that without it our long and expensive process of criminal 
trial could not sustain the burden imposed on it, and our system of criminal justice would 
grind to a halt. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 40 at 31; Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 185–
86 (2012). 
43 Frye, 566 U.S. at 134 (“The Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel 
extends to the consideration of plea offers that lapse or are rejected. That right applies to ‘all 
“critical” stages of the criminal proceedings.’”); see also Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 
(2009); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985).  
44 RALPH ADAM FINE, PLEA BARGAINING: AN UNNECESSARY EVIL, 70 MARQUETTE L. REV. 
615, 616–15 (1987). 
45 Christopher Wright Durocher, The Rise of Plea Bargains and Fall of the Right to Trial, 
AM. CONST. SOC’Y., https://www.acslaw.org/expertforum/the-rise-of-plea-bargains-and-fall-
of-the-right-to-trial/ [https://perma.cc/J735-R9QK] (“Today, more than 95 percent of cases 
that resolve in conviction are the result of plea bargains.”). 
46 Lafler, 566 U.S. at 170 (2012) (“[C]riminal justice today is for the most part a system of 
pleas, not a system of trials.”); see also Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012). 
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dangers of the plea bargain trap, Progressive Prosecutors understand the 
importance of plea bargaining fairly, and that they should use the plea 
bargain as a tool to find just outcomes as opposed to using the process to 
wrangle a guilty plea just for the sake of obtaining expediency. 
D. Decriminalize Mental Illness and Drug Addiction 
 We know that many people living with mental illness inevitably end 
up in the criminal justice system.47 “In a mental health crisis, people are 
more likely to encounter police than get medical help. As a result, 2 million 
people with mental illness are booked into jails each year. Nearly 15% of 
men and 30% of women booked into jails have a serious mental health 
condition.”48 The Progressive Prosecutor understands the importance of the 
treatment of mental illness over the criminalization of mental illness. 
Unfortunately, issues with mental illness and addiction became prominent 
in the early 1950s when the deinstitutionalization of state mental health care 
facilities forced those living with mental illness to become homeless and left 
them untreated.49 But just because state-run mental health care facilities 
closed, those living with mental illness did not simply disappear. They 
reappeared before law enforcement, then in jails, and ultimately 
courtrooms.  
The powder keg of defunding mental health care blew up. The 
criminal justice system—a process that was never intended to treat or 
properly care for those living with mental illness—was left to absorb the 
blast.50 The Progressive Prosecutor knows that just because those living with 
mental illness are arrested and charged with criminal offenses does not 
mean that such individuals truly belong in the system. Being mentally ill is 
not a crime. 
Progressive prosecutors have also turned their attention from the 
criminalization of those suffering from drug addiction to helping them 
manage and control their addict behaviors.  Progressive Prosecutors’ 
                                                           




49 Daniel Yohanna, Deinstitutionalization of People with Mental Illness: Causes and 
Consequences, AM. MED. ASS’N. J. OF ETHICS (Oct. 2013), https://journalofethics.ama-
assn.org/article/deinstitutionalization-people-mental-illness-causes-and-consequences/2013-
10 [https://perma.cc/QX6E-K758]. 
50 Stephen Raphael & Michael A. Stoll, Assessing the Contribution of the 
Deinstutitionalization of the Mentally Ill to Growth in the U.S. Incarcertaion Rates, 42 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 187, 187 (2013) (presenting research suggesting that “4-7 percent of 
incarceration growth between 1980 and 2000 is attributable to deinstutionalization.”); Mental 
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understanding of mental health care and treatment is similar to their 
understanding and approach to those who live and suffer at the hands of 
drugs addiction.51 The Progressive Prosecutor sees mental illness and 
substance abuse as ailments rather than criminal offenses and knows that 
treatment is worth more than incarceration.  
 Experience prosecutors should understand that the arrest and 
detention of those suffering from mental health or addiction crises is not the 
answer. Unfortunately, the police officers working the beat must often arrest 
or detain these individuals because there are very few alternatives; in other 
words, the choice is either the hospital or the jail.52 Hospitals do not have 
enough beds for mental health patients, so even if there is a hold on a 
patient, they eventually are released within 72 hours53—that is if they are even 
held at the hospital in the first place.54 
The reality is that most people suffering from mental illness get 
brought to jail.55 This is a failure of our system. Often times, the arresting 
officer and the prosecutor assigned to the file the following day understand 
this failure. So, what is the solution? It is lofty, but we as a society need to 
invest again in the treatment of our mentally ill.56 We need to build more 
                                                           
51 Brentin Mock, Maybe Marilyn Mosby Shouldn’t Have the Power to Prosecute Weed 
Anyway, CITY LAB, https://www.citylab.com/perspective/2019/01/marilyn-mosby-baltimore-
marijuana-cannabis-prosecute/581641/ [https://perma.cc/3B7Z-K84A]. Baltimore State’s 
Attorney Marilyn Mosby recently announced that marijuana-related charges will no longer 
be prosecuted by the state. Baltimore was just one of several cities making these changes. 
“‘Progressive Prosecutors’ in St. Louis, Philadelphia, Chicago, Houston, Manhattan, 
Brooklyn, Albany, Jersey City, Kansas City, and Norfolk, Virginia have all pledged to either 
downgrade the criminality of cannabis drug offenses or they have committed . . . to cease 
trying them altogether.” Id. 
52 See Infra note 55. 
53 MINN. STAT. § 253B.05(e) (“A person held under a 72-hour emergency hold must be 
released by the facility within 72 hours unless a court order to hold the person is obtained. 
A consecutive emergency hold order under this section may not be issued.”). 
54 Torrey Fuller, The Shortage of Public Hospital Beds for Mentally Ill Persons: A Report of 
the Treatment Advocacy Center, MENTAL ILLNESS POLICY, 
https://mentalillnesspolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/shortage-hosp-beds.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AF7B-FP3F]; Nearly 1 in 5 Mental Health Bed Days in Minnesota 
Hospitals is Potentially Avoidable, MINN. HOSP. ASS’N, 
https://www.mnhospitals.org/newsroom/news/id/1958/nearly-1-in-5-mental-health-bed-days-
in-minnesota-hospitals-is-potentially-avoidable [https://perma.cc/YKH8-3WAL]; Samantha 
Raphelson, How The Loss Of U.S. Psychiatric Hospitals Led To A Mental Health Crisis, 
NPR, (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/11/30/567477160/how-the-loss-of-u-s-
psychiatric-hospitals-led-to-a-mental-health-crisis [https://perma.cc/XC5A-VNFY]. 
55 NATIONAL ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS, supra note 47 (“Nearly 15% of men and 30% 
of women booked into jails have a serious mental health condition.”). 
56 RTI INT’L, supra note 23, at 3 (“Untreated or inadequately treated inmates are more likely 
to resume using drugs when released from prison and commit crimes at a higher rate than 
non-abusers . . . [D]iverting substance-abusing state prisoners to community-based treatment 
programs rather than prison could reduce crime rates and save the criminal justice system 
billions of dollars relative to current levels. The savings are driven by immediate reductions 
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housing and fill that housing with mental health care providers, nurses, 
doctors, therapists, and other professionals who are trained and charged 
with caring for our addicted and our mentally ill.57 
E. Deportation: Why Care Now? 
Perhaps one of the biggest challenges that faces the Progressive 
Prosecutor is deciding what role they play in the collateral consequences of 
deportation and the ramifications of convicting someone whose 
immigration status is in flux.58 Prosecutors are not legally responsible for the 
collateral consequences of deportation; the law places the burden on 
defense counsel to address deportation and immigration consequences.59 It 
should be noted, however, that prosecutors often do—and the courts must 
in Minnesota—ensure that collateral consequences of deportation and 
immigration have been explained to the defendant by defense counsel.60 
When a guilty plea results in deportation, denied citizenship, or 
immigration status that is otherwise affected in some negative way, the law 
holds that the prosecutor is not the one responsible for the adverse effect; 
the party responsible is the defendant’s attorney.61 This is most often 
because a defense attorney may fail to fully inform their client about how a 
criminal conviction may adversely affect their immigration status.62 
Traditionally, the defense attorney is the only party obligated to make a clear 
                                                           
in the cost of incarceration and by subsequent reductions in the number of crimes committed 
by successfully-treated diverted offenders, which leads to fewer re-arrests and re-
incarcerations. The criminal justice costs savings account for the extra cost of treating diverted 
offenders in the community.”). 
57 Id. (“Sending drug abusers to community-based treatment programs rather than prison 
could help reduce crime and save the criminal justice system billions of dollars . . . Nearly 
half of all state prisoners are drug abusers or drug dependent, but only 10 percent receive 
medically based drug treatment during incarceration.”). 
58 Hillary Blout, Rose Cahn & Miriam Aroni Krinsky, The Prosecutor’s Role in the Current 




59 It is counsel’s responsibility, and not the court's, to advise an accused of a collateral 
consequence of a plea of guilty; the consequence of deportation has been held to be 
collateral. See Fruchtman v. Kenton, 531 F.2d 946, 949 (9th Cir. 1976); Michel v. United 
States, 507 F.2d 461, 466 (2d Cir. 1974); Commonwealth v. Wellington, 451 A.2d 223, 225 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1982); People v. Correa, 485 N.E.2d 307, 310–11 (Ill. 1985). 
60 MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15.01 subdiv. 1 (6)(l) (“The judge must also ensure defense counsel has 
told the defendant and the defendant understands: If the defendant is not a citizen of the 
United States, a guilty plea may result in deportation, exclusion from admission to the United 
States, or denial of naturalization as a United States citizen.”) 
61 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). 
62 Id. at 368–69. 
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record that a plea or conviction would result in deportation.63 If the defense 
attorney makes this record and the client acknowledges they have been 
informed of the likelihood of deportation, the obligation is met.64 But that 
is the extent of protections for immigrants. 
Traditionally, prosecutors have ignored immigration and deportation 
consequences as collateral to a conviction. Prosecutors are under no legal 
or duty-based obligation to be mindful of these immigration consequences 
because the sole responsibility was legally placed upon the defense 
attorney.65 Progressive Prosecutors want to do more than just see a defense 
attorney meet the low bar of informing a client of their deportation and 
immigration consequences. Instead, today’s Progressive Prosecutors are 
implementing policies to ensure the consequences to a conviction will not 
result in the unnecessary deportation of an individual.66 Consider the 
example of two defendants both charged with a low-level, nonviolent theft 
offense. The first defendant is a United States citizen, and the second is not. 
Both defendants are convicted either by plea deal or trial. The first gets a 
fine, some time in jail, and probation for a few years. The second gets 
deported, loses her family, job, housing, and educational opportunities. The 
difference here is that for the second individual, her life is completely 
evaporated, whereas the first faces some relatively minor consequences. 
These results are inequitable. Across the country, Progressive Prosecutors 
are advocating for state attorneys to take deportation and immigration 
consequences into account when making any charging or plea bargaining 
decision.67 Some prosecutors across the country have begun to hire 
                                                           
63 Id. at 372. 
64 When the law is not succinct and straightforward as to whether a guilty plea will result in 
deportation, a criminal defense attorney, in order to provide effective assistance, need do no 
more than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse 
immigration consequences; but when the deportation consequence is truly clear, the duty to 
give correct advice is equally clear. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 6; Padilla, 559 U.S. at 356. 
65 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 367 (“The weight of prevailing professional norms supports the view 
that counsel must advise her client regarding the risk of deportation.”); STANDARDS FOR 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 14-3.2(f) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1999) (“To the extent possible, defense 
counsel should determine and advise the defendant, sufficiently in advance of the entry of 
any plea, as to the possible collateral consequences that might ensue from entry of the 
contemplated plea.”). 
66 Heidi Altman, Prosecuting Post-Padilla: State Interests and the Pursuit of Justice for 
Noncitizen Defendants, 101 GEO. L. J. 1, 26–27, 54–56 (2012) (arguing for the adoption of 
policies that encourage prosecutors to agree to pleas and sentences that avoid risks of 
deportation).  
67 Christie Thompson, How Prosecutors are Fighting Trump’s Deportation Plans, THE 
MARSHALL PROJECT (May 16, 2017, 10:00 PM), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/05/16/how-prosecutors-are-fighting-trump-s-
deportation-plans [https://perma.cc/4UQU-NWSM] (“[P]rosecutors across the country, are 
looking for ways to shield some low-level offenders from deportation. Many of these policies 
are being implemented by the so-called Progressive Prosecutors who were recently elected, 
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immigration attorneys68 and even make them a part of their staff to utilize 
resources for consultation before making plea deals and charging 
decisions.69 It is this model that must be adopted by all state attorneys to 
promote equity in the justice system. 
III. PROSECUTORIAL TOOLS FOR INCREASING FAIRNESS IN THE 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 
A. High Cash Bail Is the Poor Person’s Trap 
There are issues outside of criminal procedure that call into question 
the idea of fairness in the justice system. The imposition of high cash bail70  
amounts is a wagon full of snares aimed at detaining mostly poor persons.71 
If one cannot afford to post bail to allow them to be released pending their 
case’s slow march to trial, then the accused essentially has two options: (1) 
wait and stay incarcerated for a crime of which they have not yet been 
convicted (which seemingly goes against the idea of a presumption of 
                                                           
as part of an effort to reassure their foreign-born constituents that the local D.A. isn’t acting 
in lockstep with federal immigration officials.”). 
68 Christina Carrega, Brooklyn DA Eric Gonzalez Hires Staff to Protect Immigrants from 
Deportation, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 24, 2017, 11:57 AM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/brooklyn/eric-gonzalez-hires-staff-protect-
immigrants-deportation-article-1.3094689 [https://perma.cc/NC9Y-75W5] (“Acting DA Eric 
Gonzalez has hired two immigration attorneys to train all staff on immigrant issues and to 
advise on plea bargains for misdemeanors and sentencing recommendations to avoid 
deportation and other consequences.”). 
69 Shannon Prather, Ramsey County Attorney John Choi Seeks to Make Punishments Fit the 
Crime, STAR TRIB. (Feb. 19, 2019, 8:52 PM), http://www.startribune.com/ramsey-county-
attorney-john-choi-seeks-to-make-punishments-fit-the-crime/506076702/ 
[https://perma.cc/9B4Q-FATS] (“Ramsey County Attorney John Choi is directing his staff to 
consider how plea deals and sentencings might affect a defendant’s immigration status, job or 
housing—and how, in some cases, prosecutors might make those consequences less severe.”). 
70 See State v. Brooks, 604 N.W.2d 345, 349 (Minn. 2000) (citing Reynolds v. United States, 
80 S.Ct. 30, 32 (1959)) (“The United States Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of 
bail is to ensure an accused's appearance and submission to the court's judgment.”). See also 
State v. Mastrian, 122 N.W.2d 621, 622 (Minn. 1963)) (demonstrating that the Minnesota 
Supreme Court has also upheld such a purpose for bail); David Hall, It’s Time to End Cash 
Bail that Leads Unfairly to Time in Jail, JUST. POL’Y INST. (June 28, 2017), 
http://www.justicepolicy.org/news/11551 [https://perma.cc/EVF3-NLL7]. 
71 Note, Bail Reform and Risk Assessment: The Cautionary Tale of Federal Sentencing, 131 
HARV. L. REV. 1125, 1127 (2018) (citing TODD D. MINTON & ZHEN ZENG, BUREAU OF JUST. 
STAT., JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2014, at 4 (2015), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim14.pdf [https://perma.cc/B4WP-AA6C]) (“Cash 
bail results in excessive detention, wealth- and race-based discrimination, and high costs to 
taxpayers and communities. Nearly two-thirds of the people in jails in the United States have 
not been convicted of a crime.”). Many individuals subject to higher bail really do not need 
to remain in jail; often times, “a judge has already determined that they are not a flight or 
dangerousness risk.” Id.  
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innocence) or (2) plead guilty via plea deal, which often leads to an easier 
negotiation of release terms pending the sentencing phase. The availability 
of other alternatives truly comes down to one’s ability to have access to 
financial resources. Plainly put, rich people can pay for freedom while poor 
people cannot.72  Perhaps the worst possible outcome in allowing the poor 
to sit in jail is when it results in wrongful incarceration. That is, the 
prosecution finds that there is not enough evidence to proceed to trial and 
dismisses the case.73 Although the accused is ultimately released from 
custody, it can come long after he or she served several months of 
unnecessary incarceration. Today’s Progressive Prosecutor understands 
that bail should be set only when necessary in an amount that is attainable. 
Some prosecutors have developed noncash bail alternatives altogether.74 
Some counties have begun utilizing reminders and text messaging 
arrangements to ensure people’s appearance at court.75 Kim Foxx76, the 
Cook County Attorney whose recent rise to the national stage as one of the 
country’s most Progressive Prosecutors, has developed a policy in which 
                                                           
72 The Editors, The Bail System Punishes the Poor—Here are Some More Just Alternatives, 
AM. THE JESUIT REV. (Nov. 2, 2017), https://www.americamagazine.org/politics-
society/2017/11/02/bail-system-punishes-poor-here-are-some-more-just-alternatives 
[https://perma.cc/2QZ6-LNVD] (“Access to financial resources can determine whether 
someone accused of a crime can continue a normal life—including keeping a job, paying bills 
and caring for children—or must endure months or even years behind bars before going to 
trial. . . . Prosecutors can also use the threat of exorbitant bail to force people into pleading 
guilty simply to avoid jail time.”). 
73 See generally MINN. R. CRIM. P. 30.01 (“The prosecutor may dismiss a complaint or tab 
charge without the court's approval, and may dismiss an indictment with the court's approval 
. . . .”; see also MINN. R. OF PROF. CONDUCT 3.8(A) (“The prosecutor in a criminal case shall 
refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable 
cause.”) 
74 See Ariana K. Connelly & Nadin R. Linthorst, The Constitutionality of Setting Bail 
Without Regard to Income: Securing Justice or Social Injustice?, 10 Ala. C.R. & C.L. L. Rev. 
115, 150–55 (2019) (describing numerous alternatives to reform monetary bail); Courtney 
Lam, Pretrial Services: An Effective Alternative to Monetary Bail, Ctr. on Juv. and Crim. J. 
(July 2014), http://www.cjcj.org/uploads/cjcj/documents/cjcj_pretrial_reform_july_2014.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6BX4-UL6G]. 
75 Jason Tashea, Text-Message Reminders are a Cheap and Effective Way to Reduce 
Pretrial Detention, A.B.A. J. (July 17, 2018, 7:10 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/lawscribbler/article/text_messages_can_keep_people_out_of_ja
il [https://perma.cc/N7FR-YDZP]. 
76 Kimberly M. Foxx, Cook County State’s Att’y, 
https://www.cookcountystatesattorney.org/about/kimberly-foxx [https://perma.cc/7HX8-
Y64S] (“Kimberly M. Foxx is the first African American woman to lead the Cook County 
State’s Attorney’s Office—the second largest prosecutor’s office in the country. Kim took 
office on December 1, 2016 with a vision for transforming the Cook County State’s 
Attorney’s Office into a fairer, more forward-thinking agency focused on rebuilding the 
public trust, promoting transparency, and being proactive in making all communities safe.”). 
16
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low-level, nonviolent offenders are released without bail or not having to 
post cash bonds whatsoever.77  
As prosecutors gain experience as ministers of justice, it is important 
to understand that high bail amounts typically are not the answer to securing 
return to court or public safety. Posting high bail should be considered 
absurd if the prosecutor fails to consider whether the defendant can actually 
post such an amount or fails to weigh the need for such bail with the interests 
of the defendant.78 That is not to say that setting high bail amounts is an 
absurd tactic altogether. Setting high bail amounts due to public safety 
concerns is often completely appropriate where such safety would be 
ensured if the defendant could not post this bail amount. However, it is 
important for prosecutors to understand that the money posted for bail is 
often not his or her own money—it is their mother’s, uncle’s, aunt’s, or the 
community’s money. 
The solution is for the courts to allow bail amounts that are attainable 
and proportional. It may even be appropriate to let go of the fear of not 
asking for any bail at all. The truth is, bail serves very little purpose when it 
comes to ensuring public safety and whether or not someone returns to 
court.79 It is about having courage to give these low-level offenders the 
chance of returning on their word alone. It is a simple solution, but it is one 
that takes faith.  
                                                           
77  State’s Attorney Foxx Announces Major Bond Reform, Cook County State’s Att’y (June 
12, 2017), https://www.cookcountystatesattorney.org/news/state-s-attorney-foxx-announces-
major-bond-reform [https://perma.cc/49NQ-4E8D] (“Cook County State’s Attorney Kim 
Foxx announced today that her office is recommending I-Bonds for defendants who don’t 
present a risk of violence or flight. Under the new policy, prosecutors will recommend I-
Bonds, which allow a person to be released on their own recognizance pending trial, in cases 
where there is no prior violent criminal history, the current offense is a misdemeanor or low-
level felony, and there are no other risk factors suggesting a danger to the community or a 
failure to appear for court.”). 
78 In my career, I have made thousands of bail arguments, so many that I have forgotten 
about most if not all of them. I have requested bail in the amount of $1.5 million and had it 
granted. I have requested cash bail for fines on petty level offenses (albeit this was in the 
beginning of my career when I thought setting bail in the fine amount made sense). But 
looking back, it is rather absurd. When I began prosecuting, if a defendant failed to appear 
for, say, a speeding ticket, I would ask the court to set cash bail in the amount of $187 plus 
surcharges and fees. This amount equaled the precise amount of the citation. I thought, 
“great, when they post the cash bail then the fine is paid and the case is closed.” Never did I 
think someone would not be able to post such a small amount. I obviously was wrong, and I 
am certain now looking back that my naivety led to many people being held for days and 
weekends until they could finally appear in court to address something as small as a 
nonappearance. 
79 See Release: Money Bail Serves No Purpose in a Fair, Effective Justice System, JUST. 
POL’Y. INST. (September 11, 2012), http://www.justicepolicy.org/news/4365; see also Colin 
Doyle, Chiraag Bains, & Brook Hopkins, Bail Reform: A Guide for State and Local 
Policymakers, HARVARD L. SCHOOL CRIM. JUST. POL’Y PROGRAM 1, 6 (2019) 
http://cjpp.law.harvard.edu/assets/BailReform_WEB.pdf. 
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B. Tackling an Internal Cultural Problem 
With all this discretion at the Progressive Prosecutor’s fingertips, why 
are their jurisdictions not flourishing and transforming as fast or even at all? 
The answer lies from within. Though county attorneys with the mentality of 
Progressive Prosecutors run for elections on platforms promising reform, 
they are in the end just the elected official. In each county office are frontline 
prosecutors that may or may not believe in reform or progressive 
prosecution at all. Some of these prosecutors see these reforms as an attack 
on their work and an inhibition on their ability to obtain conviction after 
conviction.80 I believe that some of these prosecutors trust that it is not the 
job of a state attorney to worry about the defendant or what bad things may 
happen to defendants after their conviction. Unfortunately, these attorneys 
focus on the older way of prosecution, which is simply punishing any and 
all crime, no matter the circumstance. 
The issue for the Progressive Prosecutor boils down to one question: 
how does one change office culture and law practice in a way that 
meaningfully impacts more progressive policies and outcomes? One way of 
tackling this culture problem is refocusing from the number of convictions 
a prosecutor obtains to whether or not the prosecutor sought a just or 
equitable outcome for all parties affected by the prosecution process. 
Reeducation and mandatory trainings in the areas of cultural competency, 
economic disparity, implicit bias, and false confessions may help 
prosecutors develop a more progressive lens in how they pursue 
convictions.  Another way of enacting change or shifting office culture is 
simply by hiring prosecutors who will fit the direction and focus of the 
Progressive Prosecutor. Promoting diversity within the legal staff and the 
advancement of minorities underrepresented in the legal field and paving 
more ways for such individuals to move into key leadership roles can also 
help grow and shift cultural change.81 
There is no denying that in several parts of this country, the public is 
demanding something more from their elected prosecutors than the same 
old way justice has been done.82 Demographics are changing along with the 
public perception of what a prosecution office should be focusing on.83 If 
this were not the case, then prosecutors running on platforms of reform 
would not be winning district and county attorney races.  
                                                           
80 See The Paradox of “Progressive Prosecution,” supra note 6, at 768 (quoting Abbe Smith, 
Can You Be a Good Person and a Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 355, 384 
(2001)) (“[P]ractitioners and scholars critique prosecutors’ interest in securing a conviction; 
this interest is driven by ‘the cultural and institutional presumption in most prosecutor 
offices . . . that everybody is guilty.’ This desire to win does not necessarily lessen when the 
case is weak; rather it manifests itself through more generous plea offers from the 
prosecutor.”).  
81 Brennan Ctr. for Justice & The Justice Collaborative, supra note 2, at 14–15.  
82 See The Paradox of “Progressive Prosecution,” supra note 6, at 751–52. 
83 See id. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Although Progressive Prosecution is still on the rise, a fair and 
equitable justice system calls for quicker reform. Society finally understands 
what these progressive ideals entail. Progressive Prosecution is about caring 
for all those who are impacted by prosecution—including the accused. It is 
also about ensuring that prosecutors continue to serve United States citizens 
and noncitizens. Progressive Prosecution truly embraces the core value of 
what it means to be a prosecutor: a minister of justice. But the question 
remains whether a Progressive Prosecutor implements internal cultural 
change in an effective and meaningful way without more willingness from 
society to reform the system as a whole. For without change inside ourselves, 
we cannot expect to serve those outside of our walls to our fullest capability.  
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